Militaries the
world over are known to be averse to change. In fact, they have often been
accused of preparing to fight the last war. Liddell Hart, the Captain who taught
Generals, had said in his inimitable style almost a century ago, "The only
thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old
one out.” In his remarkable new book, “Even If It Ain’t Broke Yet, Do Fix It:
Enhancing Effectiveness Through Military Change” (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2017),
Col Vivek Chadha (Retd), analyses how the Indian Army has adapted to and dealt
with military change.
Col Chadha defines military change as
representing “an attempt at developing a significantly more effective approach
to existing or future military challenges.” Over a period of time and, based on
their experience during conventional and sub-conventional conflict, all armies reviewtheir
doctrine, strategy and organisational structures and make changes to these –
sometimes substantive and at other times tentative or experimental. Advances in
weapons technology are also a key driver of change, but primarily at the
tactical and operational levels – with the exception of the development of
nuclear weapons, which are strategic-level munitions with a geo-strategic
impact. The advent of aircraft – with the potential to destroy important
targets deep inside the adversary’s heartland – and submarines and the huge
difference these make to the capacity for sea denial, also qualify as
technology-driven changes at the strategic level.
The authorbegins by taking stock of the
writings of various scholarson military change. He quotes Prof Theo Farrell of
King’s College, London as having stated that there are three pathways to
military change: innovation, adaptation and emulation. There is merit in this
postulation.Innovation, that is applicable across an army, could be in respect
of the concept of operations, e.g. the German blitzkrieg; or, it could be
technological in nature. Adaptation is related to changes in strategy, force
levels, equipment, training and plans for operations in the context of aknown
adversary and an underlying cause for conflict. The character of conflict is
changing from predominantly state versus state conflict to that with non-state
actors and this change compels adaptation.
While innovation and adaptation are
relatively easier toweave into tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) at all
levels, emulation needs an institutionalised approach. The People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) of China studied the Gulf War (1991) and the Iraq War (2003) very
carefully and decided to emulate the doctrine and the TTPs and based its
modernisation drive with the US Army as a role model. Though it had missed the
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), much like the Indian Army missed it, the
PLA leapfrogged to its ongoing transformation that will enable it to undertake
effects-based operations (EBOs) in a network-centric environment. Similarly,
the Indian Army decided to raise artillery divisions decades after many other
armies had already done so.
In a section on conventional conflict, Chadha
assesses the impact of change in the organisational structure of the Indian
Army and changes in its military strategy in the wake of the war with China in
1962 and that with Pakistan in 1971. After the 1962 debacle, the government
sanctioned a modernisation plan for the army, the raising of HQ Central
Command, substantial increase in the total number of personnel authorized to
the army and several new mountain divisions to beef up the defences on the Line
of Actual Control (LoC). The defence budget as a ratio of the GDP went up from
2.5 to 3.5 per cent (this year it is down to less than 1.6 per cent of the
projected GDP). The General Krishna Rao committee appointed in 1975 made many
far reaching recommendations, including the raising of mechanised infantrybattalions.
It also drew up the army’sfirst long-term (15-year) perspective plan.
A decade later, General K Sundarji, who was a
member of the Krishna Rao committee, was instrumental in effecting a doctrinal
shift from reliance on a ‘strategic defensive’ strategy, with operations based on static,
obstacle-based defences to a pro-active, offensive operations doctrine that
laid emphasis on mobile operations dominated by mechanised forces. He obtained
government approval for an army aviation corps, designated one infantry division
as an air assault division for the well-known exercise Brass Tacks IV and sowed
the seeds for the raising of Reorganized Army Plains Infantry Divisions
(RAPIDs), many of which have since been raised. He also moved the deployment
areas of some mountain brigades closer to the LAC to deter aggression and minimise
the loss of territory in a future conflict with China.
Chadha also delves into the evolution of the
army’s doctrine for conventional conflict, particularly the changes that became
necessary after the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The Sundarji doctrine for
offensive operations was predicated on deep manoeuvre by the Strike Corps to
bring to battle and destroy Pakistan’s strategic reserves and inflict a comprehensive
military defeat. However, nuclear weapons had not yet made their appearance on
the Indian sub-continent. Under today’s nuclear overhang, if offensive
operations are undertaken up to strategic depth, these are likely to threaten
Pakistan’s nuclear red-lines. The army leadership concluded after a great deal
of deliberation that there is space for limited conventional conflict below the
nuclear threshold. This rationale enables India to gainfully exploit its
superiority in conventional forces to punish Pakistan for its long-drawn war to
wrest Kashmir through asymmetric means. It also enables the launching of
military retaliation for a major incident of state-sponsored terrorism like the
multiple terror attacks at Mumbai in November 2008 and, hence, furthers the
cause of deterrence.
Based on anumber of wargames and the lessons
learnt during Op Parakaram in 2001-02, the army evolved a new doctrine that is colloquially
called ‘Cold Start’. The Cold Start doctrine has two major aims. The first is
to overcome the limitation of the long mobilisation time of India’s three
Strike Corps by enabling the corps deployed forward for defensive operations to
launch limited offensive operations in an early time frame. The second aim is
to plan to conduct limited offensive operations across the international
boundary (IB) in such a manner that Pakistan’s nuclear red-lines were not
threatened. The Cold Start doctrine, also called pro-active offensive
operations doctrine, envisages several simultaneous offensive thrusts across
the IB over a wide front, but to shallow depth by division/ division plus size
integrated battle groups (IBGs). In conjunction with the air force, the
doctrine is designed to engage and destroy large elements of Pakistan’s war
machinery and, in the process, also capture some territory as a bargaining
counter.
The author has identified five imperatives
for dealing successfully with change in the domain of conventional conflict:
periodically carrying out a long-term strategic assessment; wholesome support
from the political establishment;visionary and committed military leadership;
strong institutional structures; and, appropriate follow up action to ensure
that changes are implemented effectively.All of these are unexceptionable. The
only imperative that could be added is the regular upgradation of weapons
technology so as to maintain an edge in combat capabilities.
In the second part of the book, Chadha
analyses the success achieved by the army in dealing with change in the domain
of sub-conventional conflict and counter-insurgency operations. With the help
of case studies he examines the changes that have occurred in
counter-insurgency doctrine, strategy, organisations and the conduct of
operations since the mid-1950s when the army was first employed for internal
security duties in aid to civil authority. He approves of the doctrine of ‘minimum
force’ and efforts to minimise inconvenience to the local population so as to
win hearts and minds (WHAM). The policy is known as that of an ‘iron fist in a
velvet glove’. The army’s emphasis on safeguarding of human rights and
exemplary punishment for violations and the inescapable need for the
promulgation of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) have been discussed
at length and with a critical eye. One of the root causes of most insurgencies
is the people’s sense ofalienation from the national mainstream and all of the
factors mentioned above play a major role in either negating those feelings or
accentuating them,
In organisational issues related to
counter-insurgency operations the raising of the Rashtriya Rifles (RR) as a
specialised force for such operations and its efficacy over the last two
decades have been well analysed. The RR force was raised in the early 1990s
based on the experience gained from the erstwhile ‘I’ (insurgency)battalions
that had been raised for employment in the north-eastern states and the Assam Rifles
that was initially a border guarding force, comprising locally recruited
soldiers, whose role was subsequently expanded to include counter-insurgency
operations. There are now over 60 RR battalions and these have together helped
to stabilise the security environment in Jammu and Kashmir while relieving
regular infantry battalions from internal security duties so that the latter
can devote their efforts towards their primary role of training for
conventional conflict.
As counter-insurgency operations are
conducted in aid of civil authorities, if the effectiveness of and the changes
in the methodology of the army’s dealings with the state governments had also
been examined, it would have been found that the present system of Unified
Command – which is chaired by the Chief Minister, but the organisation of which
varies from state to state – and Joint Intelligence Councils (JICs) leaves much
to be desired. State-level politics and approaching elections have often
coloured the judgement of state governments on when to ask for the army’s
assistance and when to ask it to return to the barracks, as also which
districts to declare disturbed and when to withdraw such a notification.
Disagreements of this nature at the directional level undermine the successful
conduct of counter-insurgency operations. Clearly, the present civil-military interface,
in general, and the system of Unified Commands, in particular, needs to be
overhauled.
In the concluding chapter, the author details
the results of a survey conducted among serving officers and veterans regarding
issues related to military change to validate his findings and conclusions. He
recommends the formulation of national security strategy based on a strategic
defence review, the creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) – an inevitability that has been hanging fire
for far too long, better quality of national security decision making, informed
debate on major national security issues and the raising of a Special Forces
command.
An experienced soldier and an accomplished
scholar, Col Vivek Chadha’s has written an excellent book on understanding military
change and implementing it successfully – the first one of its kind in India. This
extraordinary book on the Indian Army’s management of changemust be read by all
armed forces officers, particularly thoseofhigher ranks. In fact, it should be
prescribed reading at various schools of instruction in the armed forces and
for competitive examinations. The decision makers and the policy community
would also benefit immensely from this book, as would scholars and academics
interested in national security.
The
writer is Distinguished Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
(IDSA), New Delhi.