From strategic partnership to transactional relationship

Defence & Security Alert | Apr 6, 2018

India's new policy to diversify its sources of defence procurement, especially its reliance on Western weapons platforms despite their greater cost, had not been received well in Russia and the relationship had tended to deteriorate into a transactional rather than a strategic one. Russian leaders have repeatedly assured India that the improvement in their relations with Pakistan will not have any impact on India and Russia's "Special and privileged" strategic partnership.

Due to economically weak Russia’s unstated but deeply felt apprehensions about wealthy China’s military assertiveness, the China-Russia strategic partnership will be slow to gather momentum.
However, in the medium term, it will certainly grow in strength despite the US pivot or strategy of re-balancing to the Indo-Pacific and the growing strategic partnership between the members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, that is, Australia, India, Japan and the United States.

A vision statement issued after the Summit meeting between Prime Minister Modi and President Putin at St Petersburg in early June 2017, said: “We will upgrade and intensify this (military) cooperation, through joint manufacture, co-production and co-development of military hardware and military spares, with increasing reliance on the adoption and sharing of future technologies, in compliance with the obligations of the sides under the existing agreements on military-technical cooperation.” Three weeks later, Defence Ministers Arun Jaitley and Gen Sergey Shoigu jointly chaired the 17th meeting of the India-Russia inter-governmental Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation from June 21-23, 2017, at Moscow. The two sides agreed on a roadmap and signed a protocol to take defence cooperation to a higher level through the joint development of future weapons systems and military equipment, enhanced joint training and the exchange of visits. According to reports, India will acquire arms and equipment worth $10.5 billion from Russia including “five S-400 Triumf advanced air defence missile systems, four Grigorivich-class frigates and 200 Kamov-226T light helicopters.” Russia will also lease its second nuclear-powered submarine to India after INS Chakra. The Indian defence minister invited Russian companies to participate in defence manufacture in India as part of the government’s “Make in India” policy.
The meeting helped to arrest the recent drift in the relationship that has been described as a “special and privileged” strategic partnership since 2000. India’s new policy to diversify its sources of defence procurement, especially its reliance on Western weapons platforms despite their greater cost, had not been received well in Russia and the relationship had tended to deteriorate into a transactional rather than a strategic one.

Close Partnership

The relationship with Russia goes back to the time when India got its independence. The erstwhile Soviet Union and its successor state, Russia, have stood by India on Jammu and Kashmir over several difficult decades. One-sided UN Security Council resolutions on J&K were vetoed by the Russians many times. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of “Peace, Friendship and Cooperation”, signed before the 1971 War with Pakistan, stood India in good stead. Though the agreement was not a military alliance, India was perceived by the United States and its Western allies to have joined the Soviet camp. The 1971 agreement signalled the de facto end of nonalignment, which John Foster Dulles, US Secretary of State (1953-59), had called “immoral”.
As part of its foreign policy, India also did not lag behind in Supporting Soviet or Russian positions. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. India was privately opposed to the ill-conceived intervention as it brought the Cold War to India’s neighbourhood. However, because of the long-standing strategic relationship with the Soviets, India opted not to condemn the invasion publicly. When Indira Gandhi became the PM again in January 1980, she is known to have read out the riot act to PM Alexei Kosygin. Similarly, India is closer to the Russian position on Iran’s violation of its NPT commitments than to the US approach of imposing sanctions and holding out military threats. A negative aspect has been that the two countries have failed to cooperate on peace and stability in Afghanistan despite shared interests.

Defence Technology Cooperation

India’s acquisition of weapons and defence equipment from Russia has been the most enduring part of the India-Russia strategic partnership. (“Declaration on the India-Russia Strategic Partnership” was signed in October 2000.) Kanwal Sibal, former foreign secretary and ambassador to Russia, has written, “Because defence supplies constitute the core of the bilateral relationship, defence transactions maintain their rhythm lest the loss of their cementing force affects the entire relationship.”
Over 60 per cent of India’s defence acquisitions are still sourced from Russia. According to a SIPRI compilation, between 2012 and 2016, 68 per cent of India’s weapons and defence equipment were imported from Russia, compared with 14 per cent from the United States and 8 per cent from Israel. Russia provided several high-tech weapons platforms to India when India was still subject to technology denial regimes. Civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries has a long history. Russia gave India nuclear submarines on lease and provided assistance for the development of the cryogenic rocket engine for India’s GSLV (Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle).
State-of-the-art fighter-bombers, including the MiG-25 strategic reconnaissance aircraft, were sold to India. The two countries cooperated on the Russian GPs satellite system called GLONASS. The Russians had offered India the S-300/S-300V BMD system as far back as the mid-1990s. During the December 2014 summit meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Vladimir Putin, Russia had agreed to supply 12 nuclear power reactors over the next 20 years. Russia also supports India’s quest for membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and related groups.

Friendship Prices

The Soviet Union sold hi-tech weapons and defence equipment to India at “friendship prices” and on the basis of barter trade as India did not have sufficient foreign exchange reserves.
However, military-technical cooperation remained a buyer-seller, patron-client relationship.
While fighter aircraft and tanks were manufactured under licence in India, no Transfer of Technology (ToT) ever took place and India’s defence technology base remained low. The co-production of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile is the only example of a successful joint venture. However, it must be stated in all fairness that ToT was neither promised, nor contracted for.
The decline of Russia’s defence industry — production declined by almost 90 per cent in five years — after the collapse of the Soviet Union had an adverse impact on India’s defence procurement. India found it difficult to obtain Spare parts, get its equipment overhauled and seek upgrades. There were unacceptable time and cost overruns in executing pending orders. The five-year delay and the three-fold cost escalation in the acquisition of INS Vikramaditya (Adml Gorshkov} aircraft carrier is a typical example. According to Kanwal Sibal, “Serious problems such as those of inadequate product support, non-adherence to delivery schedules, cost escalation… affect combat readiness and disrupt planning, prompting calls for diversifying sources of supply. With Israel and France effectively competing and the US making steady headway, Russia’s privileged position as a supplier will be increasingly challenged.”
Now, these challenges are gradually being overcome, but the Russian defence industry has fallen behind the West in the development of cutting-edge weapons technologies. A new concern is about the techno-commercial feasibility of the joint development and production of the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) tentatively called PAKFA or Sukhoi T-50. The Indian perspective for future defence technology cooperation will be shaped by PM Modi’s drive to “Make in India” with ToT. Russian OEMs will need to demonstrate their competitiveness and enter into strategic partnerships by way of Joint Ventures (JVs) with Indian public and private sector companies to bid for future contracts in keeping with the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) 20106.
If they are nimble enough to rival the MNCs, India-Russia military-technical cooperation will have a bright future.
Other facets of defence cooperation between the two countries have included joint military exercises that are held annually. In November 2017, a tri-Service joint exercise was held at the battalion level near Vladivostok and in the Sea of Japan. Approximately, 900 Indian military personnel, two surface warships and two IL-76 aircraft participated. According to India’s Ministry of Defence, “Army exercise tasks involved check point defence and humanitarian convoy escort 1n the backdrop of threat from armed groups, naval tasks comprised visit, board, search and seizure operations besides force protection measures, joint air defence and anti-mining operations… the Indian Air Force and Russian Aerospace Force combined their air crews for combat air patrols, reconnaissance missions, formation flying and slithering operations utilising Russian fighters, transport aircraft and helicopters.”

Impact of Geopolitics

No bilateral relationship can remain immune to regional and international geopolitical developments. The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and the consequent end of the Cold War led to the emergence of a unipolar world order with the US as the sole super-power. In the mid-1990s, Boris Yeltsin’s Russia and Jiang Zemin’s China repeatedly made joint statements favouring a “multipolar world,” while denouncing “unipolar domination.” In the post-Cold War era of strategic uncertainty, Russian PM Yevgeny Primakov floated the idea of the ChinaIndia-Russia “strategic triangle” in December 1998. However, China was disinterested and India’s stand was one of ambivalence.
At that time, China had only recently opened up to the US and was building a strong business relationship. It was following Deng Xiao Ping’s doctrine of “strategic patience”, expressed in the well-known 24-character strategy to “hide your capacity, bide your time…” China gradually began to integrate itself with the global economy under the cloak of its self-proclaimed “peaceful rise”. However, as part of its quest for world power status, China simultaneously launched a large-scale drive for military modernisation and began to supply arms and ammunition to its allies like Pakistan. This made its Asian neighbours wary of its growing power and influence. Some of them see the US as a declining power and have begun to hedge their bets.

Pak Rapprochement

Russia’s relations with Pakistan deteriorated when, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan recruited, armed and trained the Taliban and began to support the mujahideen to fight Soviet troops. Gradually, after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in February 1989, the relationship began to improve.
Zahid Chaudhary wrote in the Pakistan Observer, “Pakistan and Russia, in November 2014, signed a defence cooperation agreement and subsequently, the two sides in October 2015 inked military-technical cooperation accord providing for arms supplies and cooperation 1n weapons development. Russia has provided four Mi-35M combat and cargo helicopters to Pakistan and the militaries of the two countries also held joint drills codenamed ‘Friendship’.” Russia has offered to sell arms to Pakistan under the garb of counter-terrorism cooperation. In Russia’s calculations, a balanced security relationship with both India and Pakistan would be beneficial tor its geopolitical aspirations. Russia has been apprehensive of NATO’s creep forward policy, moves towards an enlarged European Union, the planned forward deployment of ballistic missiles defence — ostensibly aimed at Iran but of equal effectiveness against Russian nuclear-tipped missiles, and the pro-active wooing of erstwhile Soviet States like Ukraine. The era of “Cold Peace” has dawned over Eastern Europe and Putin’s Russia has begun to gradually drift towards China and its ally, Pakistan. Russian leaders have repeatedly assured India that the improvement in their relations with Pakistan will not have any impact on India and Russia’s “special and privileged” strategic partnership. However, many in India see a challenge in the growing China, Pakistan, Russia axis, with Iran waiting in the wings.
Due to economically weak Russia’s unstated but deeply felt apprehensions about wealthy China’s military assertiveness, the China-Russia strategic partnership will be slow to gather momentum.
However, in the medium term, it will certainly grow in strength despite the US’ “pivot” or strategy of re-balancing to the Indo-Pacific and the growing strategic partnership between the members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, that is, Australia, India, Japan and the United States. Hence, the leaders of the Quad and their other strategic partners must get together early to evolve a cooperative security framework for the Indo-Pacific.