We are bad; they are worse

For well over 60 years, the Indian and Pakistani armies have had an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation on the LoC. Though a cease-fire has been in place since November 25, 2003, it is often violated. The Pakistan army and the ISI have been waging a low-cost, high-visibility proxy war since 1989-90 through fundamentalist extremist organisations like the LeT and JeM by infiltration across the LoC and incidents of terrorism. On the conventional conflict front, Pakistan has developed short-range tactical nuclear weapons to negate India’s conventional superiority. The Pakistan army fears India’s Cold Start doctrine.
Admittedly, in order to cope with internal instability and the threat from across the Durand Line, the Pakistan army and the ISI have reduced the intensity of the proxy war to a trickle. Both infiltration levels and the number of incidents of violence have reduced considerably over the last ten years. However, they are keeping the pot simmering and the infiltration machinery well-oiled so that the conflict can be ratcheted up at short notice. 
Two successive Pakistan army Chiefs have declared internal instability as the number one threat. Despite this recognition, the Pakistan army has been unable to conduct effective counter-insurgency operations, even though it has deployed more than 150,000 soldiers in the Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa and FATA. It has suffered over 15,700 casualties, including over 5,000 dead since 2008. The total casualties, including civilian, number almost 50,000 since 2001. 
Hurt by a series of Taliban successes in “liberating” tribal areas and under pressure from the Americans to deliver in the “war on terror”, in the initial stages the Pakistan army employed massive firepower to stem the rot. Helicopter gunships and heavy artillery were freely used to destroy suspected terrorist hideouts. This heavy-handed, firepower-based approach without simultaneous infantry operations failed to dislodge the militants but caused large-scale collateral damage and served to alienate the tribal population even further. 
The army had undertaken extensive counter-insurgency operations against the TTP in South Waziristan some years ago, but did not pursue the terrorists into North Waziristan due to the lack of adequate resources and preparation. 
Under General Kayani, the army put in a great deal of effort to launch a final offensive. However, since his election in mid-2013, to the army’s dismay, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has been inclined to negotiate with the TTP rather than confront them. A series of attacks by the TTP against army targets recently forced General Raheel Sharif, the present COAS, to first launch air strikes and then follow up with a ground offensive on May 21, 2014. 
While the Indian army has also been embroiled in internal security duties for over fifty years, by raising the Rashtriya Rifles force for counter-insurgency operations it has found a balance between internal security and preparation for conventional conflict. However, General V K Singh pointed out the ‘critical hollowness’ in the army’s preparedness for war in a letter to the PM shortly before the COAS demitted office in mid-2012. There are large-scale weapons, equipment and ammunition shortages. Some ammunition stocks are reported to be barely adequate for 10 days of fighting.
The Indian army’s modernisation drive has been stagnating due to the shortage of funds and the defence ministry’s reluctance to make hard decisions for acquisitions from abroad. The army is still without modern towed and self-propelled 155 mm howitzers for the plains and the mountains (the 155 mm FH 77B Bofors howitzer was acquired in the mid-1980s) and urgently needs new tanks and infantry combat vehicles with night fighting capabilities, attack and utility helicopters, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) as also special weapons and equipment for counter-insurgency operations. Also, it does not have a truly integrated C4I2SR (command and control) system for network-centric warfare, which will allow it to synergise the combat capabilities of various components and defend against cyber-attacks.
The only saving grace is that the Pakistan army’s state of preparedness and the quality of its weapons and equipment for conventional conflict are worse. If there is another round of conventional conflict between India and Pakistan, the Indian army is quite capable of giving a bloody nose to the adversary and the Pakistani military leadership knows this.