Transforming for an Uncertain Future

THE Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) finally gave its approval to the establishment of the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) in mid-January, two years after it was first conceived following the Mumbai terror strike on November 26, 2008. A month later, seven chief ministers have expressed strong opposition to the NCTC on the grounds that the states were not consulted and that the functioning of the proposed NCTC will undermine the federal structure of India’s Constitution. 
This opposition comes despite the fact that the structure of the NCTC approved by the CCS is a watered down version of the form in which the NCTC had been originally conceived by the Home Minister, Mr P. Chidambaram, following the Mumbai terror attacks. In an address to officers of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) on December 23, 2009, the Home Minister had envisioned the NCTC as an organisation capable of “preventing a terrorist attack, containing a terrorist attack should one take place, and responding to a terrorist attack by inflicting pain upon the perpetrators.” 
The NCTC had been envisaged as an umbrella organisation, which would exercise control over agencies like the National Investigation Agency (NIA), the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) and the National Security Guard (NSG). It will now be placed under the Intelligence Bureau and the existing Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) will be subsumed in it. 
The NCTC will draw up and coordinate counter-terrorism plans, integrate intelligence gathering and coordinate with all the existing investigating and intelligence agencies. The NATGRID (National Intelligence Grid), which was approved by the CCS in June 2011, will provide a data bank of 20 databases like travel records, immigration details and income tax records as inputs to the NCTC. 
Unless the NCTC is empowered to conduct counter-terrorism operations like its US counterpart, on which the Indian agency was expected to be based, urban terrorism will continue to remain a cause for concern, and much will remain to be done in the planning and execution of India’s counter-terrorism policies, the execution of which is mired in systemic weaknesses. 
Though recent terrorist strikes have been sporadic and have been spaced out in time, the overall impression that prevails is that of an unstable internal security environment in which the initiative lies with terrorist organisations and they are able to strike at will. The government needs to review its largely reactive policies and adopt pro-active measures to fight terrorism, particularly the variety that emanates from the soil of inimical neighbouring countries. 
India’s response to the Mumbai terror attacks in November 2008 was slow and laborious and poorly coordinated among the Central and the state governments and their various agencies. Coastal security was virtually non-existent; the Marine Police were too few in number to effectively patrol the vast area entrusted to them; they were ill-equipped and inadequately trained; and there was poor coordination between the Coast Guard and the Marine Police. It took far too long to begin flushing out operations and then to eliminate the nine terrorists who were holed up at three separate locations. 
The government must formulate a comprehensive approach, with all organs of the state coming together to implement a national-level counter-terrorism strategy to fight terrorism. The government must draw up a national-level strategy that is inter-ministerial, inter-agency and inter-departmental in character. Such a strategy must also balance the interests of the Central and the state governments. 
It must be ensured that the counter-terrorism policy is based on strong but egalitarian laws. India’s experiments with POTA, TADA and UAPA have failed to deliver the desired results. Laws must be just and humane and must not be designed to either be vindictive towards or shield any particular community or religious denomination. The experience of many other countries has proved that it is possible to formulate strong yet egalitarian counter-terrorism laws. The US established a powerful Department of Homeland Security following the 9/11 strikes and there has not been a major terrorist attack since then. 
One major source of the lack of a coordinated approach is the gross disconnect between how the Central and the state governments view counter-terrorism; there are glaring disparities in the views held in Delhi and the state capitals. The Constitution must be amended to move “law and order” from the State List to the Concurrent List so that the Central government can act on its own initiative when necessary, particularly in the case of externally-sponsored terrorism. And it is time the government bifurcated the internal security function of the Ministry of Home Affairs by having a separate ministry headed by a Cabinet minister. 
Besides prevention through accurate “humint” and “techint” intelligence gathering, successful counter-terrorism requires effective intelligence penetration of terrorist groups so that their leadership can be systematically neutralised by an empowered anti-terrorism agency. Comprehensive planning and better stage management are necessary for the quick elimination of a group of terrorists during a strike while the terrorists are on a killing spree. 
Post-incident investigation is aimed at unravelling the identities of the planners and the plotters, and bringing to justice the perpetrators of the incident of terrorism. The NIA must be reconstituted as it lacks teeth in its present form. It should be re-modelled on the FBI of the US to give it both preventive and investigative powers. While there is no need to blindly ape any country, there is no harm in learning from the best practices abroad and incorporating them into Indian policies. 
India’s intelligence coordination and assessment apparatus at the national level and counter-terrorism policies remain mired in the days of innocence. We are now living in the age of “new terrorism” that is far more violent and vitriolic than before, and policies must keep pace with the emerging developments. Also, the government must enlarge the scope of its counter-terrorism policy to covertly eliminate the leaders of terrorist organisations abroad who are actively engaged in sponsoring terrorism in India. This is how we can eliminate the problem root and branch. 
The writer is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.